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Truck Appointment System (TAS) is a very common IT system at marine container
port. At multiterminal port, each terminal normally operates its TAS independently,
and there is a lack of coordination on how time slots are allocated to trucks across TASs.
This is one of the major reasons for truck congestions in port hinterland area. In this
study, a concept of Tradable Truck Permit(TTP), which is adapted from the early idea
of Traffic Bottleneck Permit in urban traffic management, is introduced to coordinate
the TASs operated by different terminals located in the same port. To further improve
the utilisation of TTP, a game theoretical framework is developed to investigate the
exchange of TTPs across terminals. The framework includes a centralised decision
making model for perfect collaboration and a decentralised decision making model
for contract based collaboration. The centralised model is used for benchmarking
the performance of the contract in the decentralised decision making model. It has
been found that a bilateral buy-back contract can coordinate the exchange of TTPs.
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In other words, even when the decision on permit exchange is made by each terminal
independently, the buy-back contact can generate the same amount of profits as perfect
collaboration does as long as the parameters in the contract are set properly.
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Abstract
Truck Appointment System (TAS) is a very common IT system at marine container
port. At multiterminal port, each terminal normally operates its TAS independently,
and there is a lack of coordination on how time slots are allocated to trucks across TASs.
This is one of the major reasons for truck congestions in port hinterland area. In this
study, a concept of Tradable Truck Permit(TTP), which is adapted from the early idea
of Traffic Bottleneck Permit in urban traffic management, is introduced to coordinate
the TASs operated by different terminals located in the same port. To further improve
the utilisation of TTP, a game theoretical framework is developed to investigate the
exchange of TTPs across terminals. The framework includes a centralised decision
making model for perfect collaboration and a decentralised decision making model
for contract based collaboration. The centralised model is used for benchmarking
the performance of the contract in the decentralised decision making model. It has
been found that a bilateral buy-back contract can coordinate the exchange of TTPs.
In other words, even when the decision on permit exchange is made by each terminal
independently, the buy-back contact can generate the same amount of profits as perfect
collaboration does as long as the parameters in the contract are set properly.
Key words: Truck Appointment System, Permits, buy back contract, game theory
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the volume of containers delivered by maritime transport, the most
cost-efficient transportation mode, has been increasing significantly due to the rapid devel-
opment of economic globalisation and international trade. As a result, container traffic at
1
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port is also increasing significantly. Since trucks are commonly used for moving containers
into/out of container port, increased container ports traffic often causes severer road traffic
congestions in port hinterland areas. Road traffic congestions not only jeopardise the effi-
ciency of container flow but also cause the emission of green house gases and some other
harmful pollutants. The delays caused by truck congestions reduce the efficiency of truck
operations as well as the profits of all stakeholders involved in container supply chains such
as shippers, terminal operators and truck drivers (Huynh et al., 2016). Research has shown
that 65 percent of delays in shipping is related to port congestions (Lee, C.Y. and Meng,
2015) of which truck congestion is a major contributing factor. Truck congestions in port
hinterland also cause environmental issues. Morais Philippe and Lord (2006) analysed the
relevant data collected from the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD)
and the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) in the coastal area in Cal-
ifornia in 2003, and found that NOX emissions were 1300 ton/yr, PM emissions were 55
ton/yr, CO emissions were 1530 ton/yr. Another study conducted by (Sharif et al., 2011)
also drew a similar conclusion, and found that truck idling caused by traffic congestion led
to serious emission problems.
There are many different reasons for truck congestions in port hinterland such as bad
weather, inappropriate documents and fluctuation in truck arrival time (Maloni and C. Jack-
son, 2005; Sharif et al., 2011). However, it has been widely agreed that the main reason for
truck congestion is that most trucks may arrive during peak hours and exceed the maximum
gate capacity(Phan and Kim, 2015). The severity of truck congestion may be even worse in
the hinterland of a large port with several terminals or at the ports close to large cities(Phan
and Kim, 2015). Although congestions may occur anywhere on the road network in port
hinterland area, the most severe congestion is often observed at the public road shared by
a number of terminals. This is because all the truck flows will eventually merge at these
shared roads, which become bottleneck for the whole road network in the port hinterland
area.
As an effort to resolve the issue of truck congestion in port hinterland area, Truck Ap-
pointment System (TAS) has been proposed as a solution in shipping practice. The examples
of the application of this system include Hong Kong International Terminal (Katta G. Murty
et al., 2005) and Los Angeles/Long Beach ports (Giuliano et al., 2007). According to a study
conducted by Morais Philippe and Lord (2006) in 2002, by applying TAS system, the total
in-terminal time of all vehicles was reduced by 48 percent. Also, the research also revealed



































































with the scenario without applying TAS, the NOX emissions were reduced by 61.5 percent,
PM emissions were reduced by 63.5 percent and CO emissions were reduced by 64 percent.
Besides the efforts made in industry, in recent years, many academic studies have been
conducted to reduce the congestion and its resultant emission. Chen and Yang (2010) pro-
posed a Genetic Algorithm to determine the position and the length of a time window for a
truck to visit port. A further study conducted by Chen et al. (2013b) proposed a method
called vessel dependent time windows (VDTWs), which can minimize the total system cost
based on the estimated queue length and truck arrival time. Chen et al. (2013c) developed
a queuing model to determine the optimal hourly quota of entry appointments for TAS.
Chen et al. (2013a) proposed a bi-objective model to control truck arrival pattern in order
to reduce truck related emissions at port. Chen et al. (2011) suggested time-varying tolls
to control truck arrival at ports. Guan and Liu (2009) applied multiple server queuing the-
ory to quantify truck waiting times, and also developed an optimisation model to make a
trade-off between gate opening costs and truck waiting costs. Li et al. (2018) proposed a
response strategy to manage disrupted truck arrival at a container terminal. Sharif et al.
(2011) developed an agent-based simulation model to evaluate how live views of port gates
via webcams may affect gate congestion. Zhang et al. (2019) developed a vacation queuing
model to optimise truck appointment system. Azab et al. (2019) employed a simulation
based optimisation method to coordinate the booking of TAS with yard opperation. . Ze-
hendner and Feillet (2014)explored and developed a mixed integer linear programming to
determine the appointments number from a systemic point of view. The developed method
can minimize the total delay in the terminal taking into account the overall workload and
handling capacity. Although many existing studies showed that TAS may be useful to reduce
truck congestions and emissions, some researchers also pointed out some issues relating to
TAS. Huynh et al. (2016) highlighted shortcomings of TAS based on a review of the practical
applications and the related academic studies. Among many issues, one issue they raised is
that TAS is operated by each terminal independently at multi-terminal ports, and there is
no “port-wide real-time system visibility” of information. This actually gives truck drivers
little chance to schedule matching appointment across terminals. For example, a truck driver
may need to drop off a container at a terminal and then pick up another container at a dif-
ferent terminal in the same port. The truck driver needs to book two appointments from
each terminal, respectively, but may be unable to minimise the waiting time between two
appointments due to the invisibility of information. Giuliano et al. (2007) also observed at
the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach that TAS may be unable to help to reduce the



































































selfishly. The two studies(Huynh et al., 2016; Giuliano et al., 2007) actually revealed a very
important issue: – there is lack of coordination between the various TASs at multiterminal
port as normally each terminal runs their own TAS independently.
A research stream that closely relates to TAS is container drainage that involves trans-
porting containers via truck for short distance (Zhang et al., 2020). In some studies focusing
on container drayage, TAS has been considered. For example, Namboothiri and Erera (2008)
studied the impact of TAS on the productivity of drayage operations. In their research, in-
teger programming heuristic has been developed to measure the impact. They found that
drayage fleet efficiency can be increased by 10 - 24 percent when total access capacity of TAS
is increased by 30 percent. Yi et al. (2019) proposed a scheduling method in a TAS that
determines truck availability and container pickup/drop-off. Torkjazi et al. (2018) designed
a TAS considering container drayage routing. Shiri and Huynh (2016) formulated container
drayage problem as a multiple traveling salesman problem with time windows considering
truck appointment via TAS.
Different from the aforementioned studies, the focus of our study will be on promoting
the collaboration between TASs rather than improving the efficiency of an individual TAS
or synchronising the planning of TAS and container drayage. To the best of our knowledge,
no studies have been carried out with regard to the problem discussed above although there
are some studies investigating collaboration issues at container port. For example, Phan
and Kim (2016) investigated the collaboration between trucking companies and a container
terminal.
We will apply the concept of “Tradable Bottleneck Permits” (TBP) proposed for urban
transport network (Akamatsu et al., 2006; Akamatsu and Wada, 2017; Wada and Akamatsu,
2011; Fan and Jiang, 2013) into the issue of truck congestion in port hinterland. Adapted
from the early concept of “advance highway booking” (Liu et al., 2015; Wong, 1997), the
idea of TBP requires drivers to bid for the right to use a particular road at a pre-specified
time through internet based auction market operated by the road infrastructure manager.
In our study, however, we have slightly modified the concept of TBP, and proposed a new
type of permit termed as Tradable Truck Permit (TTP) for the specific the context of TAS
coordination at multiterminal port. The key features of TTP are twofold:
• A terminal or TAS operator, rather than a individual truck driver, needs to obtain



































































• A terminal can sell(purchase) their permits to(from) the other terminals when needed.
Our research aims to identify the best permit trading mechanism which can maximise the
overall benefits of all the TAS operators(terminals) and thus achieve systematic optimality.
Different from previous studies relating to TAS, we do not aim to optimise the benefits of an
individual TAS operator or terminal. Instead, we will focus on how to improve the overall
profits of a collection of TAS operators relating to a multiterminal port while recognising
the TAS operators have conflicting interests in sharing public road. To address our proposed
research question the issue, we will develop a research framework based on game theory.
At the end of our study, we will prove that a buy-back contract can achieve the goal and
coordinate the permit trading between the TAS operators involved at a multiterminal port.
The contributions of our research are threefold:
• a new concept of tradeable truck permit for TAS has been proposed
• a game theoretical modelling framework has been developed to design the mechanism
to coordinate the decision making of multiple TASs with conflicting interests at a
multiterminal port
• a buy-back contract has been approved to be the optimal mechanism for trading truck
permits
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we will define the
research problem as well as the notations. In Section 3, we will formulate the case of perfect
collaboration where all the stakeholders are deemed as a single organisation; we will then
formate the case of contract based collaboration in Section 4, and also design the best
mechanism to coordinate the decision-making of TASs and permit exchange activities at




pa : the number of permit that terminal A bought from the government;
da : the number of permit requested by the customer of terminal A;
db : the number of permit requested by the customer of terminal B;



































































b : the buy-back price per permit between terminal A and B;
s : the wholesale price per permit between terminal A and B;
Parameters:
N : the total number of permit the government issued;
c : the price the government charged per permit;
ga : goodwill penalty per unsatisfied permit of terminal A ;
gb : goodwill penalty per unsatisfied permit of terminal B ;
ra : profit of terminal A generated through per permit ;
rb : profit of terminal B generated through per permit ;
m : administration fee per permit for permit exchanging;
Note:
q > 0, when terminal A sell permit to B,
q < 0, when terminal A buy permit from B.
2.2 Problem Description
TAS was first introduced to shipping practice in early 2000s in USA marine container ter-
minals such as the Seaside Transportation Service (Evergreen) terminal and the West Basin
Container Terminal in Los Angeles, and Total Terminals Internationals Pier T in Long Beach
(Huynh et al., 2016). Nowadays TAS is a very common IT system for marine container port
worldwide. Its primary goal is to control the number of trucks that can come to a termi-
nal, and thus to reduce gate congestion and improve efficiency and punctuality of container
drayage.
However, TAS has some deficiency at multiterminal ports which is very common in ship-
ping industry since there is a lack of coordination across TASs operated by the terminals
associated with the same port. In practice, a terminal at multiterminal port is likely to be
operated by a company independently and has their own TAS. Since the terminal operators
associated with the same port are competitors, and they are quite reluctant to share infor-
mation. As a result, each terminal has to allocate time slots to trucks without the knowledge
of truck appointments at the other terminals. In this situation, each terminal may just try
to choose any time slots favorable for their customers’ trucks to maximise their own benefits.
The uncoordinated decision making in arranging truck appointments causes a large number
of trucks to use the public roads during the popular times slots, e.g., in the morning, which



































































of the major contributing factors for truck congestions in port hinterland area.
It will be a challenging task to coordinate the decision making between these terminal
operators as their business are almost identical and they are literally competitors of each
other. In this study, we will attempt to resolve the issue by introducing a concept of Tradable
Truck Permit(TTP), an adaption of Tradable Bottleneck Permit(TBP) as discussed early,
and designing a mechanism to promote the collaboration of terminal operators through the
exchange of permits. Our mechanism will ensure each TAS will be better off than the current
industrial practice without collaboration. Also, the mechanism will ensure the total profits
that TAS operators can gain under the mechanism will be the same as that under perfect
cooperation where all the terminals work like a single company.
We assume that terminals have already obtained a certain number of TTPs issued by
their local government. The government would issue a fixed amount of permits to ensure
high level of transport service provided in port hinterland area, and requests each truck must
have a permit to use public road to go into a terminal. The permit is valid in a certain time
period, and if not used, will expire afterwards. The government allows that unused valid
permits can be traded between different terminals, and the terminals can decide the price
they would like to charge each other.
We consider a stylised multiterminal port with two terminals operated independently:
terminal A and terminal B. Both terminals need to receive an uncertain number of trucks
that may need to pick up or drop off containers. Each terminal makes its internal and ex-
ternal decision independently to maximise its own profit. As a consequence, when they use
TASs to manage the arrival time and the amount of trucks, they do not consider the social
benefit of the port hinterland as a whole system, e.g., traffic congestion on the road. Further,
because of the competition between each other, their decisions are nontransparent to each
other. Each terminal makes their purchasing decision on the number of permits based on
an estimate of customer demands. As the estimated customer demands are very likely to be
different from the actual ones at each terminal, the number of permits a terminal has may
be higher or lower than what would be required. To maximise their profits, one way is to sell
the spare permits to the other terminal. The amount of permits that can be traded between
the two companies is affected by a set of parameters, e.g., the initial number of permits held
by each individual terminal, the different amount of profits generated by one permit at each



































































Let N denote the total number of government issued permits that is available for terminal
A and B to purchase. c denotes the price that the government charges per permit. The num-
ber of permits terminal A purchases from the government is denoted by pa and thus N − pa
will be that of company B. da, db are two random numbers following a certain distribution,
and denote the customer demands of terminal A and B, respectively. ra, rb represents the
profits generated from one permit at terminal A and B correspondingly. The lost sales costs
incurred at terminal A is ga, and gb at company B when the terminals have no permits to
receive their customers’ trucks. A terminal can sell their spare permits to the other but
an adminstration fee of m per permit will be applied. The goals of the two terminals are
to maximise their own profits, and the decisions the two terminals need to make are: the
number of permit exchanged between terminal A and B, q, which is positive when terminal
A sells permit to B, and vice vera; and the price, b, which the terminals should charge each
other. The key task of our research is to set up a contract to coordinate the decision making
of the two terminals and maximise the profits of the entire system. By assigning proper
values to the paramors in the contracts, the two companies will choose an exchange amount
which can maximise the total profit of the system even though two terminals still make
decisions unilaterally.
We will apply game theory to investigate the aforementioned issue. Two types of collab-
oration modes and the corresponding decision making frameworks will be considered:
• Perfect collaboration under centralised decision making
• Collaboration via contract under decentralised decision making
Under the perfect collaboration mode, the decision will be made in a centralised manner,
and the two terminals are practically deemed as a single organisation. We will determine
the optimal amount of permits traded between the two terminals as well as their overall
profits for the perfect collaboration, and then use the result to benchmark the contract or
the mechanism we will try to design for decentralised decision making.
Under the decentralised decision making framework, two terminals make decisions inde-
pendently. Each terminal will attempt to maximise their own profit regardless of the other’s
decision making. In fact, this is what terminals at multiterminal port are doing in practice,
and also the main cause of truck congestion. Our research will attempt to design a contract
or mechanism to coordinate the decision makings of the two terminals. The contract or
mechanism under development is expected to perform as well as centralised decision making



































































how they charge each other for permit exchanging. Following the contract, the decision
makings of the two terminals will be coordinated in the sense that the performance of de-
centralised decision making will be the same as that of centralised one.
In the following, we will present our mathematical formulation and analysis for the two
collaborations modes.
3 Perfect Collaboration under Centralised Decision Mak-
ing
Let Qa(pa, q) denote the fulfilled number of permits in terminal A:
Qa(pa, q) = min{pa − q, da}
Let Ua(pa, q) denote the unsatisfied number of permits in terminal A:
Ua = [da − (pa − q)]+
For terminal B, the fulfilled number of permits and unsatisfied number of permits can be
defined as follows:
Qb(N − pa, q) = min(N − pa + q, db)
U b = [db − (N − pa + q)]+
As discussed above, the terminals can trade permits with additional adminstration cost
m per permit paid by the seller. Based on the above assumptions, when considering a
decentralized situation where terminal A and B operate separately and make decisions only




a, q) = −c · pa + ra · EQa + s · q +m · q+ − ga · EUa
The profit function of terminal B can be formulated as Πb(p
a, q):
max Πb(p
a, q) = −c · (N − pa) + rb · EQb − s · q +m · q− − gb · EU b
If the two companies are practically deemed as a single company, and operated under a



































































without charging each other. The only cost element relating to permit exchange will the
administration cost m. The objective fundtion is to maximise the system profit Π(pa, q),
which can be formulated as follows:
max Π(pa, q) = −c · N + ra · EQa − ga · EUa + rb · EQb − gb · EU b +m · |q|
It should be noted that, when q = 0, Π(pa, q) is not differentiable.
Proposition 1 Π(pa, q) is strictly concave in q.
Proof.
max Π(pa, q) = −c ·N + ra · EQa − ga · EUa + rb · EQb − gb · EU b −m · |q|
= −c ·N + ra · Emin{pa − q, da} − ga · E(da − pa + q)+
+ rb · Emin{N − pa + q, db} − gb · E(db −N + pa − q)+ −m · |q|
= −c · N + ra ·
[



























For any q 6= 0,
∂Π(pa, q)
∂q




b + gb) ·
∫ ∞
N−pa+q
fb(x)dx− ra +rb −m · sgn(q)
Because π(pa, q) is not differentiable at q = 0, the difference between its right derivative
and left derivative is: −2m. Since m > 0, −2m < 0.
For any other points, π(pa, q) are differentiable, thus
∂2Π(pa, q)
∂q2
= −(ra + ga) · fa(pa − q)− (rb + gb) · fb(N − pa + q) < 0.
Therefore, Π(pa, q) is strictly concave in q.
According to Proposition 1, the total profit of all terminals Π(pa, q) changes with the
permit exchanging number. There exists the optimal transfer amount of permits which



































































Π(pa, q) increases in q; when the exchanging permit number is bigger than the optimal one,
Π(pa, q) decreases in q. The practical implication for container terminals is that they should
dynamically adjust the number of permits to be exchanged in practice with respect to the
total profits obtained. Given the convexity, an approximate gradient search method may be
effective to identify the optimal exchange amount if the cost structure is complex in practice.
From the conclusion of Proposition 1, for any given pa, we know there is only one permit
exchanging amount, q0 ∈ [−(N−pa), pa], which can maximise the profit of the whole system.
The condition for the profit of the entire system (including both terminal A and B )being
maximized is to make ∂Π(p
a,q)
∂q
= 0(q 6= 0). Let q∗ and q∗∗ denote the optimal exchange
amount of permits, and Π+(pa, q), Π−(pa, q) the corresponding profits when q → 0+ and








b + gb) ·
∫ ∞
N−pa+q
fb(x)dx− ra + gb −m = 0
∂Π−(pa, q)
∂q




b + gb) ·
∫ ∞
N−pa+q
fb(x)dx− ra + gb +m = 0
The maximum number of permits that can be exchanged is always no more than the per-
mits each terminal purchased from the local government, i.e., pa for terminal A and N − pa
for terminal B. By considering the relationship between pa, N −pa, p∗, and p∗∗, we can iden-
tify five cases with each having a different value for the optimal permit exchanging amount.
Case 1: If 0 < pa < q∗
As q∗ is the optimal solution to maximise the total profit of terminal A and B when q > 0,
and Π(pa, q) is a concave function for q, this means that the system profit will increase with




. Therefore, the optimal exchange amount q0 = pa.





Since q∗ is the optimal solution and no more than the number of permits on hand, qa, the








































































Similar to case 2, the optimal amount of permits to be exchanged is q∗∗.
Case 4: If q∗∗ < −(N − pa) < 0
Similar to case 1, the optimal exchanged amount of permit is −(N − pa).











which indicates that Π(·) achieve the extreme value when q = 0. In this case, the terminal
A and B should keep their own permits and do not exchange them with the other.
The above discussion can be summarized as the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The optimal transfer amount of permit q0 is :
q0 =

pa if 0 < pa < q∗
q∗ if 0 < q∗ < qa
q∗∗ if − (N − pa) ≤ q∗∗ ≤ 0
−(N − pa) if q∗∗ < −(N − pa) < 0
0 if q∗∗ < 0 < q∗
According to Proposition 2, in case 1 and 4, the system profit can be improved by pur-
chasing more permits from government; however, in case 2 and 3, increasing the number of
permits purchased does not help to improve the profits of terminals; in case 5, it can be
found that no permits exchange is the optimal choice.
As discussed early, the overall profit of the entire system is equal to the sum of the profit
of terminal A and that of terminal B minus the administration cost of permit exchanging
between the terminals. To maximise the total profits, under full collaboration mode, the




































































4 Collaboration via Contract under Decentralised De-
cision Making
In this section, Terminal A and Terminal B are considered as two independent companies.
They make their decisions on permit purchasing and trading to optimise its own profit.
The lack of information transparency between the two terminals may result in a suboptimal
condition for the entire system as well as each individual terminal. The permit exchange
between the two terminals can be considered as an inventory transshipment game. In the
following part of this section, the game between the two players will be investigated, and a
contract will be designed to collaborate the decision making between the two terminals and
optimise the profits of individual stakeholder as well as the whole system.
4.1 Buy-back contract
The truck operation permits can be traded between terminals, and a terminal may buy/sell
permits from/to the other terminal. In practice, the demands of each terminal are dynamic
and uncertain, consequently it is inevitable for them to face the risk of permit over-stocking
or under-stocking. To mitigate this risk, a buy-back contract is designed to enhance the
cooperation between the two stakeholders. In the study, the buy-back contract works in the
following way: a terminal sells permits to the other with a unit wholesale price of s, and pay
an additional administration fee of m; the other terminal is allowed to return the purchased,
but not used, permits, with an unit buying-back price of b. The principle of the buy-back
will be followed when a terminal purchases the permits from the other, and only applied to
the permits purchased rather than any leftover for any reason. For the sake of fairness, we
assume the buy-back prices of terminal A and B are the same.
Let s denote the wholesale price per permit, b the buy-back price per permit. The pay-
ment F (·) made by terminal A to B for permit exchanging can be formulated as:
F (q, pa, b) = s · q+ − b · Emin{(pa − q − da), q+} − s · (−q)+
+ b · Emin{(N − pa + q − db), (−q)+}
In the above equation, the first item in the equation means the wholesale revenue ter-
minal A may receive from selling q+ permits; and the second item represents the payment
made by terminal A for buying-back the sold but unused permits. The third and the four



































































A is short of permits.
The profit function of Terminal A can be defined as:
Πa(q, , N,m, pa, b) = −c · pa + ra · Emin{pa − q, da} − ga · E(da − pa + q)+
+ s · q+ − b · Emin{(pa − q − da), q+} − s · (−q)+
+ b · Emin{(N − pa + q − db), (−q)+} −m · q+
The profit function of Terminal B can be written as:
Πb(q,N, pa,m, b) = −c · (N − pa) + rb · Emin{N − pa + q, db} − gb · E(db −N + pa + q)+
− s · q+ + b · Emin{(pa − q − da), q+}+ s · (−q)+ −m · (−q)+
− b · Emin{(N − pa + q − db), (−q)+}
Terminal A and Terminal B make their decisions on the permit exchange independently
based on the number of permits they purchased from government, the wholesale price and
the buy-back price per permit. In other words, each terminal decides whether they will sell
or buy permits from the other terminal. Let qa, qb denote the amount of permits to be
exchanged at Terminal A and Terminal B, respectively. Please note that qa, qb can be either
positive or negative. qa > 0 indicates that Terminal A has surplus permits and need to
sell some of them to Terminal B; qa < 0 means Terminal A is short of permits to fulfil his
demand and need to buy from the other terminal. It should be pointed out that qb has the
opposite physical meaning for for Terminal B. A positive qb means Terminal B need to buy
permits from the other terminal and a negative qb means Terminal B need to sell its spare
permits.
The transaction of permits between the two companies has two scenarios: 1) Terminal
A has a permit surplus, and terminal B has a permit deficit; 2) Terminal A has a shortage
of permits; and Terminal B has a surplus of permits. The permit exchange amount q∗ is the
smaller of the exchange requirements of the two terminals, i.e. q∗ = min{qa, qb}.
Proposition 3 The system will never be coordinated when the two companies operate inde-




































































When the two terminals are deemed as a centralised organization, the permits to be ex-
changed between the two only incur adminstration costs. The systematic optimal exchange
amount q0 was obtained for this scenario. For the decentralised decision making scenario, the
exchange cost per permit include the whole sale price which is more than the administration
cost. It’s clear that the increment of cost for obtaining permit will result in the deduction
of exchange amount. This means that the exchange amount between the companies under
pure decentralised scenario will always smaller than q0, and their profits will not be better
than that under perfect collaboration. In other words, the system will never be coordinated.
Condition 1: 0 ≤ b ≤ min{(ra + ga), (rb + gb)}
Condition 1 implies, when one terminal buy back the unused permits from the other after
permit exchanging, the buy back price paid would be a value between 0 and the minimum
value of the profit generated by a permit in terminal A and B.
Proposition 4 Profit function of Terminal A and Terminal B are all strictly concave in q
when condition 1 is satisfied.
Proof:
The profit function of Terminal A is:
Πa(q, pa, N, b) = −c · pa + ra · Emin{pa − q, da} − ga · E(da − pa + q)+
+ s · q+ − b · Emin{(N − pa + q − db)+, q+} − s · (−q)+







































































Πa(q, pa, N, b) = −c · pa + ra · Emin{pa − q, da} − ga · E(da − pa + q)+
+ s · q+ − b · Emin{(N − pa + q − db)+, q+} −m · q
= −c · pa + ra ·
[





















∂Πa(q, pa, N, b)
∂q
= −(ra + ga) ·
∫ ∞
pa−q




∂2Πa(q, pa, N, b)
∂q2
= −(ra + ga) · fa(pa − q)− b · fb(N − pa + q) < 0
if q < 0,
Πa(q, pa, N, b) = −c · pa + ra · Emin{pa − q, da} − ga · E(da − pa + q)+
− s · (−q)+ + b · Emin{(pa − q − da)+, (−q)+}
= −c · pa + ra ·
[




















∂Πa(q, pa, N, b)
∂q
= −(ra + ga) ·
∫ ∞
pa−q




∂2Πa(q, pa, N, b)
∂q2
= −(ra + ga − b) · fa(pa − q) < 0
The profit function of Terminal B is:
Πb(q, pa, N, b) = −c · (N − pa) + rb · Emin{N − pa + q, db} − gb · E(db −N + pa − q)+
− s · q+ + b · Emin{(N − pa + q − db)+, q+}+ s · (−q)+
− b · Emin{(pa − q − da)+, q+} −m · (−q)+



































































Πb(q, pa, N, b) = −c · (N − pa) + rb · Emin{N − pa + q, db} − gb · E(db −N + pa − q)+
− s · q+ + b · Emin{(N − pa + q − db)+, q+}
= −c · (N − pa) + rb ·
[




















∂Πb(q, pa, N, b)
∂q
= (rb + gb) ·
∫ ∞
N−pa+q




∂2Πb(q, pa, N, b)
∂q2
= −(rb + gb − b) · fb(N − pa + q) < 0
If q < 0,
Πb(q, pa, N, s, b) = −c · (N − pa) + rb · Emin{N − pa + q, db} − gb · E(db −N + pa − q)+
+ s · (−q)+ − b · Emin{(da − pa + q), (−q)+} −m · (−q)+
= −c · (N − pa) + rb ·
[





















∂Πb(q, pa, N, b)
∂q
= (rb + gb) ·
∫ ∞
N−pa+q




∂2Πb(q, pa, N, b)
∂q2
= −(rb + gb) · fb(N − pa + q)− b · fa(pa − q) < 0
From above discussion, it can be concluded that when the buy-back price b satisfying
Condition 1, the profit of the two terminals are strictly concave in q. This means that under
Condition 1, there exists the optimal amount of exchanging permit which can maximise
terminal A’s profit. There is another amount of exchanging permit which can maximise
terminal B’s profit. However, the two amounts might be different. This leads to the following
proposition.



































































permit transfer amount denoted as q∗a and q
∗
b which can guarantee respectively each terminal
can obtain its highest profit.
Based on Proposition 5, Terminal A will gain the maximum profits when its exchange
amount is q∗a. However, a notable fact is that the transfer of q
∗
a permits from Terminal A
to Terminal B is conditional on whether terminal B is willing to purchase the amount of
permits. Actually, it is more often that the amount of Terminal B needs to purchase is
different from terminal A’s optimal selling amount, q∗a. The similar situation is also applied
to terminal B. Due to the difference between one terminal’s selling amount of permits and
the other terminal’s purchasing amount, the gaming process between the two terminals will
lead to a Nash equilibrium, and consequently, the following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 6 Under condition 1, there exists Nash equilibrium for the permit exchanging
game, which is a Pareto Optimal. The optimal permit transfer amount under Nash equilib-





Under this equilibrium, The optimal permit transfer amount can be calculated by {min[(q+a )∗, (q+b )∗]−
min[−(q−a )∗,−(q−b )∗]}. There are three possibilities for transfer amount in equilibrium: q∗a, q∗b
and 0. As the profit function of each terminal is concave, no one can improve its own profit
level without doing harm to the other’s profit. This equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
4.2 Contract Design
In this section, a bilateral buy-back contract will be designed for the two terminals to co-
ordinate their decisions which may lead to the Nash equilibrium discussed in Proposition 6.
The related parameters in the contract will also be determined. The target of the contract
is to ensure the entire system as well as each individual terminal can achieve its maximum
profit.
In Section 3, we obtained the optimal permit exchanging amount under perfect collab-
oration, q0. If we let Terminal A to exchange the same amount of permits under decen-
tralised decision-making case, the profits terminal A can gain are Πa(q0, p
a, N, s, b). Let
Πa(0, pa, N, s, b) denote the profits also in the decentralised decision making case, but with



































































4Πa(pa, N, s, b) = Πa(q0, pa, N, s, b)− Πa(0, pa, N, s, b)
= ra · Emin{pa − q0, da} − ga · E(da − pa + q0)+
+ s · q+0 − b · Emin{(N − pa + q0 − da), q+0 } − s · q−0
+ b · Emin{(pa − q0 − da), q+0 } −m · q+0 − ra · Emin{pa, da}+ ga · E(da − pa)+
If q > 0,
4Πa(pa, N, s, b) = ra ·
[


















































If q < 0,
4Πa(pa, N, s, b) = ra ·
[



















































































































Similarly, the profit difference of Terminal B can be calculated as:
4Πb(pa, N, s, b) = Πb(q0, pa, N, s, b)− Πb(0, pa, N, s, b)
= rb · Emin{N − pa + q0, db} − gb · E(db −N + pa − q0)+
− s · q+0 + b · Emin{(N − pa + q − db)+, q+0 }+ s · (−q0)+
− b · Emin{(pa − q0 − da), (−q0)+} −m · (−q0)+
− rb · Emin{N − pa, db}+ gb · E(db −N + pa)+
If q0 > 0,
4Πb(pa, N, s, b) = rb ·
[




















































































































4Πb(pa, N, s, b) = rb ·
[




















−m · (−q0)+ − rb ·
[



























The profit difference of the system under decentralised decision making in the two cases with
the exchange amounts, q0 and 0 is:
4Π(pa, N) = Π(q0, pa, N)− Π(0, pa, N).
From previous discussion, we know that 4Π(pa, N) = 4Πa(pa, N, s, b) +4Πb(pa, N, s, b).
We define the marginal profit as the first order derivative of profit increment with respect to q.
The marginal profit of Terminal A is :




−(ra + ga) ·
∫∞
pa−q fa(x)dx+ s− b ·
∫ N−pa+q
0
fb(x)dx−m, q > 0
−(ra + ga) ·
∫∞
pa−q fa(x)dx− s− b ·
∫ pa−q
0
fa(x)dx, q < 0
The marginal profit of Terminal B is :










fb(x)dx, q > 0









































































In the following, five different cases will be discussed to identify the condition that the
parameters in the buy-back contract need to satisfy to coordinate the system.
(1) q0 = p
a
In this case, terminal A sells permit to terminal B. The exchange amount is the total number
of permits terminal A bought from the government. The system profit increment is:
4Π(pa, N) = Π(q0, pa, N)− Π(0, pa, N)
= 4Πa(pa, N, s, b) +4Πb(pa, N, s, b)














For each terminal, the motivation to transfer permit is that it can have positive marginal





















From Eq: F1, it is clear that for any given b, the profit of terminal A is increasing in s.
When s = (rb +gb) ·
∫∞
N−pa+q fb(x)dx+ b ·
∫ N−pa+q
0
fb(x)dx, terminal A can achieve its highest
profit. By plugging s = (rb + gb) ·
∫∞
N−pa+q fb(x)dx + b ·
∫ N−pa+q
0
fb(x)dx, into the following
equation,

















































































4Πa(pa, N, s, b) = −(ra + ga −m)q0 −
[


































The profit difference is increasing in the buy back price b. To ensure the concavity of the
profit function of the two companies, the following condition need to be met: 0 < b ≤
min{(ra + ga), (rb + gb)}.
If (ra + ga) > (rb + gb), then b∗ = rb + gb and 4Πa(pa, N, s, b) is maximised. By plug-





fb(x)dx, we can get s = r
b+gb.
Similarly, if (ra + ga) < (rb + gb), then b = ra + ga, s = rb + gb − [rb + gb − (ra + ga)] ·∫ N−pa+q
0
fb(x)dx, 4Πa(pa, N, s, b) achieve its maximum value.
The lower bound of 4Πa(pa, N, s, b) is achieved when b = 0 then s = (rb + gb) ·∫∞
N−pa+q fb(x)dx.
(2) q0 = 0
In this case, no permit exchange is the optimal solution for the terminals. The entire system
has no profit increment and each terminal only keeps its own profit. In order for q0 = 0, the















































































By plugging the first order of derivatives of profit increment, we can have,




























(3) q0 = q∗
In this case, terminal A provides permits to terminal B. q∗ is the optimal exchange amount
under perfect collaboration for the case q ∈ (0,+∞). To ensure the optimal exchange
amount to be q∗ under decentralised decision making, the derivative of the increment of
system profit with regard to q should be 0. Also, it should be profitable to exchange permit
for each terminal. Consequently, the derivative of profit increment of each terminal with








By expanding the Left-Hand-Side of the equations, we can have














By substituting s into the profit increment function of terminal A, we can get
4Πa(q∗, pa, N, s, b) = Πa(q∗, pa, N, s, b)− Πa(0, pa, N, s, b)
















































































When b = rb + gb and s = rb + gb, the Terminal A achieve its maximum profit and when
b = 0,then s = (rb + gb) ·
∫∞
N−pa+q∗ fb(x)dx, Terminal A obtains its minimum profit.
(4) q0 = q∗∗
In case 4, terminal B provides permits to terminal A. q∗∗ is the optimal exchange amount un-
der perfect collaboration for the case q ∈ (−∞, 0). Similar to case 3, the following condition





















4Πa(q∗∗, pa, N, s, b) = Πa(q∗∗, pa, N, s, b)− Πa(0, pa, N, s, b)














When b = 0 and s = −(rb + gb) ·
∫∞
N−pa+q∗∗ fb(x)dx + m, the Terminal A achieve its maxi-
mum profit and when b = ra+ga,then s = −(ra+ga), Terminal A obtains its minimum profit.
(5) q0 = −(N − pa)
In case 5, if terminal B provides permits to terminal A and the exchange amount is the total























































































4Πa(q0, pa, N, s, b) = Πa(q0, pa, N, s, b)− Πa(0, pa, N, s, b)














As q0 = −(N − pa) < 0, for any given b, the profit difference of terminal A is reducing in







terminal A can achieve its maximum profit.
4Πa(q0, pa, N, s, b) = Πa(q0, pa, N, s, b)− Πa(0, pa, N, s, b)











It is decreasing in b. When b = 0, 4Πa(q0, pa, N, s, b) obtain its maximum value:







Terminal A obtains the minimum profit increment when b = ra + ga,s = ra + ga.



































































buy back price can satisfy the following certain constrains,
(1)when q0 = pa
(ra + ga) ·
∫∞




≤ (rb + gb) ·
∫∞




(2)when q0 = 0
(rb + gb) ·
∫∞


















≤ (rb + gb) ·
∫∞




(3)when q0 = q∗
(ra + ga) ·
∫∞




= (rb + gb) ·
∫∞




(4)when q0 = q∗∗
−(ra + ga) ·
∫∞




= −(rb + gb) ·
∫∞




(5)when q0 = −(N − pa)













The centralised decision making mode depicts an ideal cooperated situation for multiple
terminals at port. In the ideal scenario, the permits exchanged aim to maximise the total
profits of all terminals. However, in the real world, the terminals are operated indepen-
dently, and each terminal makes decisions on permit exchanging only considering its own
profit. Therefore, the optimal permit exchange amount from the perspective of an individual
company is very likely to be different from the optimal exchange permit number of the entire
system. To enable the system to be coordinated and achieve the same profits as that under
the centralised mode, a buyback contract is required. The above five different cases define
the conditions involving the wholesale price and the buyback price to coordinate the system.
Once a buyback contract meets the conditions, the profit obtained under the decentralised
decision making mode can be the same as that under the ideal collaboration - the centralised
decision making.
5 Numerical Experiment
In section 4, the coordination of the system is achieved by applying the designed buyback



































































The parameters are set as follows:
pa = 600, c = 20, N = 1000, ra = 80, rb = 120, ga = 40, gb = 30
X1 ∼ Normal(600, 100) , X2 ∼ Normal(500, 100), m = 5.
We will determine a set of contract parameters including wholesale price s, buy-back
price b, and permit exchange number q, to coordinate the entire system. In other words,
by applying a contract with the optimal parameters, the decentralised system can achieve
the maximised profit that is the same as or very close to the maximum system profit under
centralised mode(ideal case). The numerical example is conducted using Mathematica.
We first analyse the system when it is operated under a centralised decision making mode.
The relationship between the entire system profit and the number of transferred permit can
be plotted using Mathematica and shown in the following figure:
The diagram is in line with Proposition1. The system profit is strictly concave in q.
Therefore, there exists a q∗ (0 < q∗ < pa)which can lead to the maximum system profit.
When the permit exchange number q = 83, the system profit reaches its maximum value,
69039.7.



































































profit respectively. A buy-back contract enables the terminals to exchange permits and buy-
back the unused permits at an agreed price to coordinate the system.
By setting the parameters for the contract appropriately and making the number of ex-
changed permits the same as that under the centralised decision making mode, it is possible
that the total profits of the two terminals independently operated can be the same as that
under centralised system.
In this example, under the decentralised system, when the wholesale price s = 152.51
and the buy-back price b = 120, the permit exchange number q = 83, the maximum profits
of terminal A and B are 32079.5 and 36832.4, respectively. The total profits under this
condition is 68911.9. There is only a small difference of 0.18% between the maximum system
profit under the centralised mode and that under decentralised decision making due to the
rounding-up of permit exchange number. Therefore, the numerical case indicates that the
system can be coordinated under the buy-back contract with the given set of parameters.
6 Conclusion
As an attempt to improve Truck Appointment System, the research designed a mechanism
for the exchange of Tradable Truck Permits. We have considered two different collaboration
modes: perfect collaboration and collaboration via contacts. We first formulated the case
of perfect collaboration where all the terminals are practically deemed as a single company,
and obtained the maximised profits and the optimal amount of permits to be exchanged. We
then formulated the case of collaboration via contracts where each terminal makes decision
independently on truck booking without the knowledge of the other terminal’s truck appoint-
ments. We proved that a buy-back contract can coordinate the decision makings of terminals
in the sense that the total profits generated under buy-back contract is the same as that
of perfect collaboration. This has been further validated by the provided numerical example.
TAS is a widely deployed IT infrastructure to reduce the emission and congestion, which
are two serious problems faced by many ports and local governments all over the world.
However, lack of coordination of TAS is one of the major issues that jeopardise their effi-
ciency. In recognition of the issue, our research has presented the concept of Tradable Truck
Permit as well as a buy-back contract that has been proved to be the optimal mechanism



































































envisaged that our research will be useful to enhance the performance of TAS.
Our research is only a start point to promote the collaboration between TASs. There are
many further research oppotunities in the field. For example, further research may focus on
how government should issue truck permits. In our study, we consider the number of permits
issued by government is given, and has not considered how government need to make the
decision. Also, further study may consider how the permits exchange will affect road traffic.
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